

Message Text

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USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0420

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP MEETING OF NOV
14, 1974

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. AT ITS NOVEMBER 14 MEETING, THE AD
HOC GROUP (AHG) HEARD BRIEF BILATERAL ON AIR FORCE
DATA, DISCUSSED THE NOV 12 INFORMAL SESSION, NOTED
UNEXCEPTIONABLE STATEMENT BY HUNGARIAN REP AT NOV 14
PLENARY (SEPTTEL), DEBATED FUTURE TACTICS VIS-A-VIS
THE EAST, AGREED ON AN APPROACH FOR THE NOV 19
INFORMAL, AND AGREED ON A TENTATIVE SCHEDULE FOR
WESTERN PLENARY PRESENTATIONS DURING THE REMAINDER OF
THE FOURTH ROUND. FOLLOWING UP ON THE RECENT

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BELGIAN DEMARCHE IN ALLIED CAPITALS AND ON HIS OWN

PREVIOUS ARGUMENTATION AT AHG MEETING, BELGIAN REP (ADRIAENSSEN) AGAIN URGED TACTICAL SHIFT IN WESTERN NEGOTIATING LINE FROM THE "WHOSE FORCES" FRAMEWORK TO PURPORTED "MIDDLE GROUND" BETWEEN WESTERN FIRST PHASE AND EASTERN FIRST STEP APPROACHES, IN ORDER TO ENGAGE EAST IN NEGOTIATION REGARDING COMMON CEILING OUTCOME. ADRIAENSSEN'S VIEWS FAILED TO GAIN ANY SUPPORT WITHIN THE GROUP, WHICH DECIDED TO MAINTAIN CURRENT TACTICS.

2. BILATERALS

US REP NOTED THAT SOVIET DEPREP (SMIRNOVSKY) HAD CLAIMED TO HIM NOV 11 THAT EAST HAD LESS AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN NGA THAN WEST. US REP SAID THIS WAS FIRST COMMENT BY EAST ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER DATA SINCE WEST HAD PROPOSED DATA EXCHANGE. FRG REP (BEHREND) RECALLED BILATERAL STATEMENTS IN DECEMBER, 1973, BY SOVIET DELOFF KVITSINSKIY, IN ARGUING FOR INCLUSION OF AIR PERSONNEL IN COMMON CEILING, TO THE EFFECT THAT NATO AIR FORCES IN NGA TOTALLED 200,000 AND PACT AIR FORCE TOTAL WAS LESS. COMMENT: IN NOV 13 BILATERAL WITH US DELOFF (KAPLAN), CZECHOSLOVAK DEPREP (MEISNER) STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF "REDUCTIONS OF GERMANS" FROM THE OUTSET. WHEN US DELOFF ASKED "WHICH GERMANS," MEISNER REPLIED: "BOTH". HE SAID SOVIETS HAD IMPORTANT "POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS" FOR DEMANDING REDUCTIONS OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS FROM THE OUTSET. ONE REASON WAS TO GET A HANDLE ON FRG. THE OTHER WAS TO ASSURE SIMILARLY SIZED EAST EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS, IN ORDER NOT TO MISLEAD EASTERN EUROPEAN POPULATIONS INTO THINKING THAT SOVIETS WOULD REDUCE THEIR MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE REGION RELATIVE TO INDIGENOUS EAST EUROPEAN FORCES. WHEN US DELOFF ASKED WHICH REASON WAS MORE IMPORTANT TO SOVIETS, MEISNER SAID: "BOTH REASONS PROBABLY ARE ABOUT EQUALLY IMPORTANT." OTHER REMARKS BY MEISNER WERE REPORTED IN MBFR VIENNA 417 (NOFORN). END COMMENT.

NOVEMBER 12 INFORMAL

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3. CANADIAN REP (GRANDE) SAID RECORD OF NOV 12 INFORMAL (MBFR 411 AND 412) PLAINLY INDICATED THAT NO PROGRESS WAS MADE IN THAT SESSION AND THAT CURRENT EASTERN TACTICS WAS ONE OF DELIBERATE STALLING, ON ALL POINTS EXCEPT WHERE THEIR OWN PROPOSAL WAS CONCERNED. GRANDE NOTED THAT EASTERN REPS HAD GIVEN CLEAR, ALBEIT NEGATIVE, RESPONSES TO SOME OF THE WESTERN QUESTIONS. HE THOUGHT ALLIES NOW HAD GOOD BASIS FOR CREDIBLE PUBLIC POSTURE, SHOULD THE NEED

ARISE FOR DEMONSTRATING EAST'S INFLEXIBILITY. BEHREND'S AGREED, ADDING THAT EAST APPEARED TO BE PRECLUDING INDICATING ANY FLEXIBILITY ON MODALITIES OF THEIR FIRST STEP PROPOSAL UNLESS WEST FIRST ACCEPTED IT AS BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION. BEHREND'S NOTED THAT EAST HAD NOT RESPONDED TO QUESTION WHETHER THEY WOULD REDUCE MORE THAN WEST.

4. US REP POINTED OUT THAT EASTERN REPS HAD GIVEN BRUSH-OFF TO WESTERN PRESENTATION ON GROUND FORCE RE-CATEGORIZATION AND DATA EXCHANGE, AND SUGGESTED THAT ALLIED REPS OPEN DISCUSSION WITH THOSE TOPICS AT NOV 19 INFORMAL, WHICH WEST WILL HOST. US DEPREP SAID SOME ALLIED QUESTIONS APPEARED TO THROW EASTERN REPS OFF BALANCE. IN PARTICULAR, HE CITED QUESTIONS OF WHETHER EAST WOULD TAKE LARGER REDUCTIONS THAN WEST AND WHETHER CEILINGS OF ANY KIND MUST BE INCLUDED IN A FIRST STEP. QUESTION OF CEILINGS IN FIRST STEP INTRODUCES ISSUES OF VERIFICATION AND DATA EXCHANGE, WHICH DO NOT FIT INTO EASTERN FIRST STEP APPROACH. US DEPREP CONCLUDED THAT EASTERN DELS PROBABLY HAD LITTLE AUTHORITY FOR MANEUVER UNLESS WEST ACCEPTED FIRST STEP FRAMEWORK, BUT ARGUED THAT ALLIES SHOULD PRESS NONETHELESS FOR CLEAR ANSWERS TO THEIR QUESTIONS. THOSE ANSWERS WOULD FURTHER CONFIRM HOW LITTLE NEW SUBSTANCE EASTERN PROPOSAL REALLY CONTAINED.

TACTICS

5. BELGIAN REP (ADRIAENSSEN) COMMENTED THAT NOV 12 INFORMAL WAS ONE OF THE MOST NEGATIVE YET. EAST HAD CLEARLY REBUFFED WESTERN PHASING CONCEPT AND WOULD NOT ALLOW ALLIED SUGGESTIONS FOR DATA EXCHANGE TO DEFLECT EAST FROM ITS FIRST STEP PROPOSAL. IN HIS VIEW,
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THE TWO SIDES IN FACT HAD REACHED AN IMPASSE ON "WHOSE FORCES" ISSUE AND THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WAS BECOMING, DE FACTO, THE BASIS OF NEGOTIATIONS. FOLLOWING THE REASONING IN RECENT BELGIAN NOTE ON COMMON CEILING (STATE 249100) AND HIS OWN RECENT AHG INTERVENTIONS (MBFR VIENNA 0373 AND A-21), ADRIAENSSEN URGED THAT WEST RE-ORIENT THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE INFORMAL MEETINGS FROM "WHOSE FORCES" FRAMEWORK TO PURPORTED MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN EASTERN INITIAL STEP PROPOSAL AND WESTERN FIRST PHASE, NEITHER OF WHICH IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE OTHER. BELGIAN REP SAID ALLIES SHOULD EXPRESS WISH TO REACH AGREEMENT IN 1975, SUGGEST THAT DISCUSSION FOCUS ON WHAT MIGHT BE COMPONENTS OF AGREEMENT WHICH COULD BE REACHED NEXT YEAR, AND EMPHASIZE TO EAST THAT COMMON CEILING AND INITIAL REDUCTION OF US/SOVIET GROUND FORCES WOULD FOR THE WEST BE ESSENTIAL

COMPONENTS OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT. ADRIAENSSEN CLOSED BY CHIDING UK FOR EARLIER INSISTENCE ON TREATING THE COMMON CEILING AS MERELY AN AFTER THOUGHT IN NOV 14 PLENARY STATEMENT. BELGIAN REP SAID THE COMMON CEILING WAS THE CORNERSTONE OF ALLIED POSITION -- NOT JUST AN APPENDIX -- AND AHG REPS NEEDED A NEW AND BETTER TACTICAL FRAMEWORK IN WHICH TO PRESS FOR IT.

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

6. AHG DISCUSSION THAT FOLLOWED LEFT ADRIAENSSEN TOTALLY ISOLATED. ACTING ITALIAN REP (TALIANI) SAID EAST HAD MADE CLEAR ITS INFLEXIBILITY AT NOV 12 INFORMAL AND THERE THUS APPEARED TO BE NO BASIS FOR SEEKING MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN FIRST PHASE AND FIRST STEP. WHILE AHG HAD BROAD FLEXIBILITY ON TACTICS,

BELGIAN REP SEEMED TO BE CALLING FOR SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE OF COURSE WHICH WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH ALLIED POSITION AND WHICH THUS WOULD REQUIRE NAC APPROVAL. US DEPREP RECALLED THAT JULY AHG REPORT TO NAC HAD ALREADY INDICATED INTENTION TO MOVE IN VIENNA FROM "WHOSE FORCES" ISSUE TO COMMON CEILING. ALLIED REPS HAD COMMENCED THIS PROCESS THROUGH SUGGESTING GROUND FORCE DEFINITION AND DATA EXCHANGE, BUT CERTAIN DECISIONS WERE NEEDED FROM NAC

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IN ORDER TO FACILITATE EFFECTIVE ALLIED DISCUSSION OF REDUCTION PROGRAMS AND COMMON CEILING, US DEPREP NOTED THAT NOV 14 WESTERN PLENARY STATEMENT HAD STRESSED THAT "COMPROMISE" PROPOSAL MUST DEPART FROM ORIGINAL POSITIONS. THIS STANDARD WOULD HAVE TO APPLY TO BELGIAN REPS PROPOSAL. HE ASKED WHICH ASPECT OF ALLIED POSITION BELGIAN REP WAS PREPARED TO DROP.

7. UK REP (ROSE) ALSO OPPOSED BELGIAN REP'S SUGGESTION, AGREEING WITH US DEPREP THAT ALLIES WOULD HAVE TO JETTISON SOME PART OF WESTERN PROGRAM IF THEY WERE TO AVOID TRANSPARENCY OF PURPORTED MOVE TO "MIDDLE GROUND." AS NEITHER SIDE APPEARED TO HAVE AUTHORITY TO SHOW ANY REAL FLEXIBILITY, ROSE THOUGHT THE ONLY CURRENT HOPE FOR SOME PROGRESS TOWARD COMMON CEILING GOAL WAS TO PRESS FOR DISCUSSION OF GROUND FORCE DEFINITION AND DATA EXCHANGE, RE-RIASE ALLIED QUESTIONS FROM LAST TWO INFORMALS, AND, ONCE NAC GUIDANCE RECEIVED, OFFER NO-INCREASE ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER. FRG REP (BEHREND) OBSERVED THAT IN LAST INFORMAL, IT WAS EAST WHICH HAD HELD ON TO "WHOSE FORCES" ISSUE, WHILE WEST TRIED TO MOVE TOWARD COMMON CEILING AS DESIRED BY ADRIAENSSEN. BEHREND, GRANDE, TALIANI AND NETHERLANDS REP (DE VOS) ALL SUPPORTED THE SPECIFIC APPROACH DESCRIBED BY UK REP.

8. CONSISTENT WITH ABOVE APPROACH, GROUP ENDURED US REP'S SUGGESTION THAT TALKING POINTS FOR NOV 19 INFORMAL START WITH SHORT RESUME OF DATA EXCHANGE ISSUE, REVIEW THE QUESTIONS POSED BY THE WEST WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN ANSWERED, AND, FOLLOWING LIKELY EASTERN STATEMENT BOOSTING THEIR PROPOSAL, BRIEFLY CRITIQUE THE EASTERN INITIAL STEP PROPOSAL AGAIN. AHG ALSO AGREED THAT GUIDANCE ON NO-INCREASE OF MANPOWER WAS URGENTLY NEEDED AND THAT GROUP MIGHT SEND SPECIAL MESSAGE TO NAC ON THIS TOPIC IF NAC GUIDANCE SEEMED UNLIKELY TO BE AVAILABLE IN TIME FOR USE AT NOV 26 INFORMAL.

SCHEDULE FOR FUTURE WESTERN PLENARY STATEMENTS

8. AFTER GENERAL DISCUSSION, GROUP AGREED TENTATIVELY

THAT WEST SHOULD MAKE PLENARY STATEMENTS NOV 28 (ON
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COMMON CEILING), DECEMBER 5 (ASSOCIATED MEASURES) AND
DEC 12 (SUMMING UP). IN CONNECTION WITH DEC 5 STATEMENT,
US REP NOTED NEW US NATO PROPOSALS ON VERIFICATION AND
STABILIZING MEASURES. SEVERAL AHG REPS FAVORED DEC 5
DATE FOR STATEMENT ON ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN ORDER TO
PROVIDE NAC SUFFICIENT TIME TO ASSURE GUIDANCE ON BOTH
OF THESE POINTS.

NOV 14 POST PLENARY PRESS BRIEFING

9. US DEPREP REPORTED THAT, FOLLOWING NOVEMBER 14 PLENARY,
ALLIED PRESS SPOKESMAN MADE THE STATEMENT ON EASTERN
INITIAL REDUCTIONS PROPOSAL APPROVED AT NOV 13 AHG
MEETING (SEPTTEL). US DEPREP SAID THE PRESS PUT NO
FURTHER SPECIFIC QUESTIONS REGARDING EITHER FIRST STEP
PROPOSAL OR NOV 14 WESTERN PLENARY STATEMENT. MOREOVER,
THE EASTERN SPOKESMAN'S BRIEFING WAS VAGUE AND
UNEXCEPTIONABLE. RESOR

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